【主講】劉焱 美國普渡大學管理學院博士生

【主題】On the Timing and Depth of a Manufacturer’s Sales Promotion Decisions with Forward-looking Consumers

【時間】2009-12-3（周四）13:30-15:00

【地點】清華經管學院舜德樓101

【語言】英文

【主辦】市場營銷系

【簡介】

This paper investigates a manufacturer’s optimal timing and depth of price promotions over a planning horizon in a frequently purchased packaged goods context. Promotion policy is the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game between consumers and the manufacturer. Consumers form expectation over future promotions and strategically time their purchase to coincide with the manufacturer’s promotion events. The forward-looking manufacturer takes this consumer behavior into account and dynamically evaluates promotional response of consumers in each choice segment based on their inventory levels when making optimal promotion decisions