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 Dissertation: "Essays on Innovation"
 Grade: Highest Honor with the Congratulations of the Jury

D.E.E.Q.A. June 2008, Toulouse School of Economics
 Master Science Economiques, June, 2007, Toulouse School of Economics
 Master in Management, July 2004, Peking University
 Bachelor in Management, July 2002, Univ. of Sci. and Tech. of China
 Bachelor in Material Physics, July 2002, Univ. of Sci. and Tech. of China

University of East Anglia	Research Associate in Centre of Competition Policy	2012.9-
European University Institute	Jean-Monnet Fellow in R.S. Centre of Advanced Studies	2011.9-2012.8
Toulouse School of Economics	Teaching Assistant Contract Theory, Prof: Patrick Rey	2011.1-2011.4
University of Toulouse 1	Teaching Assistant Applied Econometrics, Prof. Nobert Ladoux	2010.3-2010.6
Peking University	Instructor (in Chinese) Course: Managerial Economics	2006.3-2006.7
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ESRC Research Funding, 2012-
 Jean-Monnet Fellowship, 2011-2012
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Eiffel Scholarship, French Government, 2006-2009
Prize Fellowship, Peking University, 2003
Certificates of Microsoft Certified System Engineer, Microsoft Certified Professional, 1999

Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Corporate Finance, Internet Economics, Intellectual Property Right

Chinese (native), English (fluent), French (fluent)

Conference on Patents, Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 2012 (USPTO, Washington)
World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2010 (Shanghai)
EARIE Annual Conference 2010 (Istanbul), 2011 (Stockholm)

Invited Seminars in Peking University, Renmin University, University of International Business and Economics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
Jamboree for Young Economists 2008 (Madrid), 2010 (Toulouse)
ASSET Annual Conference 2010 (Alicante), 2011 (Evora)
Conference on Private Sector in Public Service, 2009 (Bruxelles)
Conference on Software Platforms and Internet, 2009, 2011 (Toulouse)
6th Annual Conference of Centre of Competition Policy (Norwich)
Annual Scientific Seminar of Florence School of Regulation 2011, 2012 (Florence)

(with Zonglai Kou and Patrick Rey, Forthcoming 2013 *Journal of Industrial Economics*)

The paper offers a novel justification for positive non-obviousness requirement. An innovation consists of two steps: research and development. Research results in a blueprint of new technology while development makes it profitable. Only patented technology will be developed. One innovator who can be either efficient or inefficient must attract the financial support of venture capitalists for further development. We show that, under some plausible assumptions, strengthening the non-obviousness requirement alleviates ex ante adverse selection by discouraging inefficient type, but exacerbates ex post free-riding effect; while the socially optimal nonobviousness requirement should be large enough to achieve full screening, i.e., the inefficient type should be totally excluded from the market. We also discuss how the research and development costs affects the optimal policy.

We use a dynamic framework in which the probability of an accident is a stochastic process that can only be observed by the insured in the beginning of each period, and a T-period contract between the insurer and insured must be signed in the beginning of period 1. We then investigate the optimal long-term contract of the insurer. Using the recursive envelop theorem developed by Pavan and Segal (2008), we develop the ex-ante optimal contract of the insurer, and we find that in some case, the optimal contract requires the insurer “rationally ignore” the information update of the insured, truthful revealing will take place in every period while the contract will only base on the initial probability of accident.

We establish a simple framework relying on queuing theory to analyze the effect of net neutrality on file sharing users. We find that net neutrality regulation does not necessarily improve consumer surplus as well as the social welfare; it depends heavily on the extra traffic generated by file sharing service and the distribution cost of the content produced by the content provider. Moreover, if we allow the Internet Service Provider charging the Content Provider for content distribution, the Internet Service Provider could obtain the optimal level of the industrial profit by successfully manipulating the pricing strategy of the Content Provider.

In this paper, we establish a model including one basic product –the “platform,” which is produced uniquely by the incumbent; and two “applications” based on the platform, which are produced by the incumbent and the entrant respectively. The entrant can invest in the compatibility research to make his application compatible with the incumbent so that customers will have the option of multi-homing; while the incumbent can make a pre-commitment of free offering the application before the research results are revealed. Our results indicate that, under pre-commitment regime, the entrant will invest more in the compatibility research and that the social welfare is also higher than the regime without pre-commitment. On the other hand, pre-commitment also reduces the expected profit the entrant, which increases the deterrence probability.

Recently, more and more enterprises begin to migrate their data centre from private servers to cloud servers. We develop a principal-agent model to analyze the underlying economic explanation of such a trend and then extend it into a dynamic environment. Our results indicate that there is a trade-off between market information precision and rent extraction which affects the choice of private server or cloud service. Moreover, in the multiple-period scheme, the downward distortion is more likely to decrease discretely along with the time, which in turn stipulate the extend of migration of the enterprises.

"Illiquidity and Bank Reputation", 2012

"Financial Regulation of Venture Capital", 2011

"Quantity Premium in Parallel Trade" 2010

"Continuous Effort with Discrete Payment", 2009

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